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Abstract
In a model of banking we give money a role in providing cheap
collateral; i.e. besides the Taylor Rule, monetary policy can a¤ect the
risk-premium by varying the supply of M0 in open market operations, so
that even at the zero bound monetary policy is still e¤ective, and scal
policy still crowds out investment. A simple rule for making M0 respond
to credit conditions can substantially enhance the economys stability.
This, in combination with Price-level or nominal GDP targeting rules
for interest rates, stabilises the economy further, making aggressive and
distortionary regulation of banks balance sheets redundant.
Keywords: DSGE model; Financial Frictions; Crises; Indirect Infer-
ence; money supply; QE; monetary policy; scal multiplier; zero bound
JEL classication: E3; E44; E52; C1;
Corresponding Author: Cardi¤ Business School, Cardi¤ University, Cardi¤, CF10 3EU.
email: meenaghd@cardi¤.ac.uk
1
The nancial crisis of 20072011 has challenged our previous understanding
of the monetary system, with its assumptions that asset markets are complete
and that money injections work solely through the setting of interest rates on
safe short-term government bonds. Instead it now seems more promising to
assume that nancial assets, and specically bonds and credit, are imperfect
substitutes and that money substitutes with a wide variety of nancial and
real assets in rather di¤erent ways; in such a world we can nd a role for
Quantitative Easing (QE)OpenMarket Operations  that has now become
a major instrument of monetary policy. This world harks back to that of
Friedmans Quantity Theory restatement (Friedman, 1956) and Brunner and
Meltzers papers on the banking system (e.g. Brunner and Meltzer, 1963) as
a transmission mechanism for money.
In this paper our aim is to construct a DSGE model in which this imperfect
substitution occurs between nancial assets and in which therefore money has a
role beyond merely setting the interest rate on short-term government bonds,
bank rate for short. To do this we borrow from available models of the
economy, banking and collateral to create out of them what could be called a
neo-monetarist model. Another element we inject is the possibility of hitting
the zero bound on the bank rate; we do this quite simply by suspending the
Taylor Rule when bank rate solves for this level or below and replacing it with
this exogenous lower bound; this does not undermine ination determinacy
because this situation cannot continue indenitely since the shocks to interest
rates must die out in time. We test this model against the key features of US
macroeconomic data and compare its performance with other models that do
not have these new elements; we nd that our augmented model gets somewhat
closer to the datas behaviour.
The model has clear welfare and policy implications. In the economy there
are two main interest rates, the safe rate on short-term bonds and the risky rate
on bank credit. The rst regulates consumption, while the second regulates
investment. From a welfare viewpoint one may consider the rst as designed
to smooth consumption, while the credit premium should be smoothed at its
friction-minimising level and the instrument that can do this is the mone-
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tary base (QE) which provides (monetary) collateral for banked investment
projects.
There is also a role for regulation in this model, that is parallel with QE:
it too may be used to stabilise the credit-premium, by loosening regulation
when credit is expensive and vice versa. However, it can only have such a
role if in steady state regulation is pitched at a distorting level, to raise the
credit premium above its optimal, no-friction, rate; in this case, regulation
can be lowered when the credit premium is high (in a downturn) and raised
when it is low (in an upturn). This cannot however be optimal because the
steady state intervention is distorting. If the steady state level is pitched at a
non-distorting level, then regulation can only be raised to o¤set a falling credit
premium; it cannot be lowered any further with any e¤ect since it is having
no e¤ect already.
Plainly, this would not be a problem if there was some other reason to set
regulation at some high level  e.g. to prevent future banking crises. Yet
we show later in this paper that banking alone cannot create crises according
to this model; crises require non-banking shocks and banking shocks merely
contribute to some worsening of crises when they happen. This points to
the need for stabilising policies that are non-distortive, in the face of all such
shocks; it does not justify distortive regulation unless such policies cannot do
the job. Yet we also show later that monetary policy is a powerful stabiliser
when augmented to include the use of the monetary base.
Finally, once money is introduced in the way we have done here, scal
policy no longer has a strong e¤ect with a xed money supply even when
the zero bound knocks out the Taylor Rule. The scal multiplier is the same
whether interest rates are at the zero bound or not. The reason is that scal
policy crowds out investment via the credit premium even though the safe
interest rate does not move.
Thus our aim in this paper is to bring data to bear on the important
policy issues identied here through the means of an estimated and tested
DSGE model of the US economy. We are aware that there are other ways to
bring data to bear on these issues: thus generalised VAR estimation may show
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the e¤ects of di¤erent sorts of factors  as Stock and Watson (2012)  and
the narratives of the economic history of the Great Recession may also shed
light. Nevertheless these ways have their own drawbacks; the di¢culties of
identifying structural shocks in VARs and the possibilities of subjective bias
in narrative both put limits on these methods; it is not easy to refute or conrm
any causal processes they suggest. If we turn to alternative ways of estimating
and testing this model structurally, we could have used Bayesian methods
with strong priors which then dominate the results but the di¢culty here lies
in the selection of such priors when controversy surrounds most elements in
our model; we could have chosen at priors and thus moved to pure Maximum
Likelihood estimation but here the problem is rather at likelihood surfaces
under small samples with these models (Canova and Sala, 2009), small-sample
estimation bias, and rather weak power in the resulting Likelihood Ratio tests
(Le et al, 2015). The strength of the indirect inference method we will be
using is that we can identify a particular model, and, even though this model
is highly nonlinear because of the zero bound switch, estimate it with only
minor bias and perform a test that has substantial power. Thus we can be
challenged by the normal methods of science in future work. Meanwhile our
model has clear implications which we can use for policy analysis; these include
a clear way to calculate the necessary robustness tests for policy results.
Thus the contribution of this paper is rst to extend the New Keynesian
model to include sectoral competition, banking and money, so that it can deal
with the zero bound and the role of money while also tting the facts of our
sample period from the early 1980s to the present; second to use an estimation
and testing technique (based on Indirect Inference) that is powerful enough to
give policymakers a set of reformed rules with a clear robustness metric.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 1 describes the new model; in
section 2 we explain our testing procedure; in section 3 we test the model
against the key data features; in section 4 we analyse the recent banking
crisis; in section 5 we look at policy and other implications along the lines just
discussed; and section 6 concludes.
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1 The model
Our starting point in this paper is the work of Le et al. (2011) in nding
a version of the Smets and Wouters (2007, SW) model of the US that could
t key US data features from the early 1980s. This New Keynesian model,
which largely follows the specication of Christiano et al. (2005), is widely
considered to get reasonably close to US data; as is familiar, it embodies
habit-persistence for consumers, adjustment costs in capital, variable capac-
ity utilisation, price/wage setting via Calvo contracts plus indexation and a
Taylor Rule setting interest rates. Le et al. nevertheless found that further
modications were necessary to get it to replicate US data features. They
showed that the original New Keynesian (NK) model was rejected. A New
Classical (NC) version with fully exible prices and wages and a simple one-
period information delay for labour suppliers was also examined and rejected.
Due to both models being rejected they proposed merging the NK and NC
models in to a hybrid model. They did this by assuming that wage and price
setters supply labour and intermediate output in two markets; a competitive
market with price/wage exibility and a market with imperfect competition.
They assumed the size of each sector did not vary in sample because they
depended on the facts of competition, but the share of imperfect competition
between labour and product markets was allowed to di¤er. The idea behind
this was that di¤erent product sectors have di¤erent degrees of competition.
Similarly with labour markets; some are much more competitive than others.
The price and wage setting equations in the hybrid model are assumed to be
a weighted average of the corresponding NK and NC equations.
They found that this hybrid model was much closer to the data for the
full sample. The reasons for this are that the NK model generated too little
nominal variation while the NC model delivered too much. Because the hybrid
model could reproduce the variances of the data the model was able to more
closely match the overall data behaviour. Further changes were made by Le
et al. (2012, 2013) to incorporate a banking sector, following Bernanke et
al. (BGG, 1999). The BGG model introduces credit, extended by banks to
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entrepreneurs. There is a question whether these credit contracts are optimal,
compared for example with equity (Mookherjee and Png, 1989; Duncan and
Nolan, 2014). However they are widely observed, especially among small and
medium-sized ones and we therefore assume here that other types of contract
are not feasible1.
With this addition the model divides the production side into three dis-
tinct participants: as in SW, retailers and intermediate goods producers (now
called entrepreneurs for a reason described later) and in addition, capital pro-
ducers. Retailers function in the same way as before, operating in perfect
competition to produce nal goods by aggregating di¤erentiated intermediate
products using the Dixit-Stiglitz technology. With the assumption that retail
output is made up of a xed proportion of intermediate goods in an imperfectly
competitive market and intermediate goods sold competitively, the aggregate
price is a weighted average of prices received in the two types of market. As a
result, the aggregate price equation is unchanged. Capital producers operate
in a competitive market and take prices as given. They buy nal consumption
goods and transform them into capital to be sold on to entrepreneurs.
The di¤erence of BGG from SW lies in the nature of entrepreneurs. Whilst
still producing intermediate goods, they now do not rent capital from house-
holds (who do not buy capital but only buy bonds or deposits) but must buy
it from capital producers and in order to buy this capital they have to bor-
row from a bank which converts household savings into lending. On their
production side, entrepreneurs face the same situation as in Le et al. (2011).
They hire labour from households for wages that are partly set in monopolis-
tic, partly in competitive labour markets; and they buy capital from capital
producers at prices of goods similarly set in a mixture of monopolistic and
competitive goods markets. Thus the production function, the labour demand
and real marginal cost equations are unchanged. It is on their nancing side
that there are major changes. Entrepreneurs buy capital using their own net
1Equity contracts require a high degree of audit, as the manager is typically the recipient
of the funds from the backing shareholders. Keeping track of the managers activities
and general use of the funds is intrusive and costly. This could make equity contracts
prohibitively expensive.
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worth (nt), pledged against loans from the bank, which thus intermediates
household savings deposited with it at the risk-free rate of return. The net
worth of entrepreneurs is kept below the demand for capital by a xed death
rate of these rms (1   ); the stock of rms is kept constant by an equal
birth rate of new rms. Entrepreneurial net worth therefore is given by the
past net worth of surviving rms plus their total return on capital (cyt) minus
the expected return (which is paid out in borrowing costs to the bank) on the
externally nanced part of their capital stock  equivalent to
nt = nt 1 +
K
N
(cyt   Et 1cyt) + Et 1cyt + enwt (1)
where K
N
is the steady state ratio of capital expenditures to entrepreneurial
net worth,  is the survival rate of entrepreneurs and enwt is a net worth
shock. Those who die will consume their net worth, so that entrepreneurial
consumption (cet) is equal to (1  ) times net worth. In logs this implies that
this consumption varies in proportion to net worth so that:
cet = nt (2)
In order to borrow, entrepreneurs have to sign a debt contract prior to the
realisation of idiosyncratic shocks on the return to capital: they choose their
total capital and the associated borrowing before the shock realisation. The
optimal debt contract takes a state-contigent form to ensure that the expected
gross return on the banks lending is equal to the bank opportunity cost of
lending. When the idiosyncratic shock hits, there is a critical threshold for
it such that for shock values above the threshold, the entrepreneur repays
the loan and keeps the surplus, while for values below it, he would default,
with the bank keeping whatever is available. From the rst order conditions
of the optimal contract, the external nance premium is equated with the
expected marginal product of capital which under constant returns to scale
is exogenous to the individual rm (and given by the exogenous technology
parameter); hence the capital stock of each entrepreneur is proportional to his
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net worth, with this proportion increasing as the expected marginal product
rises, driving up the external nance premium. Thus the external nance
premium increases with the amount of the rms capital investment that is
nanced by borrowing:
Etcyt+1   (rt   Ett+1) =  (qqt + kt   nt) + eprt (3)
where the coe¢cient  > 0 measures the elasticity of the premium with
respect to leverage. Entrepreneurs leverage up to the point where the expected
return on capital equals the cost of borrowing from nancial intermediaries.
The external nance premium also depends on an exogenous premium shock,
eprt. This can be thought of as a shock to the supply of credit: that is, a
change in the e¢ciency of the nancial intermediation process, or a shock to
the nancial sector that alters the premium beyond what is dictated by the
current economic and policy conditions.
Entrepreneurs buy capital at price qqt in period t and uses it in (t+ 1)
production. At (t+ 1) entrepreneurs receive the marginal product of capital
rkt+1 and the ex-post aggregate return to capital is cyt+1: The capital arbitrage
equation (Tobins Q equation) becomes:
qqt =
1  
1   +RK
Etqqt+1 +
RK
1   +RK
Etrkt+1   Etcyt+1 (4)
The resulting investment by entrepreneurs is therefore reacting to a Q-ratio
that includes the e¤ect of the risk-premium. There are as before investment ad-
justment costs. Thus, the investment Euler equation and capital accumulation
equations are unchanged from Le et al. (2011). The output market-clearing
condition becomes:
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
innt +R
K
 ky
1   
 
rkt + c
e
yc
e
t + egt (5)
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1.1 Modications to the BGG model to allow e¤ects of
Quantitative Easing and Bank Regulation
In the years since the crisis there have been key developments in the monetary
scene. The rst has been the zero bound on o¢cial interest rates, as central
banks have driven the rate at which they will lend to banks down virtually
to zero. The second development has been aggressive open market operations
(Quantitative Easing), intended to inject liquidity into the banking system
and spur greater credit creation. The third has been more intrusive regulation
of banks, via increased capital and liquidity ratios. It seems important to us to
introduce into the model here a tool to deal with each of these developments.
Let us begin with bank regulation: what this does is to raise the cost of
lending to entrepreneur-rms, or rms for short  this is the credit friction.
The regulations insist banks hold as counterpart funds for the credit assets they
hold, not purely deposits that have low cost but also in particular capital; the
latter is more expensive because shareholders putting up such equity require an
appropriate premium to compensate them for the risk the banks losses will
lose this capital. We do not model the regulations explicitly through these
balance sheet quantities but for simplicity put into the model an addition to
the credit friction, , reecting these requirements  and also the costs of
other regulative intrusions2.
Next, we consider the role of QE. To deal with this, we note that in BGG
rms put up no collateral. Net worth by construction is all invested in plant,
machinery and other capital. However, once so invested, this amount cannot
be recovered at original value plainly: it will have less value as second hand
sales when the rm goes bankrupt because it has become specialised to the
rms activities. The cost of bankruptcy recovery (costly state verication)
applies to the valuation of the activity this capital still allows.
It is in fact normal for banks to request an amount of collateral from the
rms to which they lend. This gives rms more incentive to avoid bankruptcy.
(Some models underpin bank contracting entirely on the basis that banks will
2Such as ringfencing di¤erent activities and imposing high liquidity ratios.
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only lend against collateral Kiyotaki andMoore (1997) however we do not
adopt this extreme position here.) We therefore supplement the BGG model
by the assumption that banks require rms to put up the amount of collateral,
c, as a fraction of their net worth. We also assume that recovery of this typical
collateral costs a proportion, , of its original value when posted  we can
think of the example of a house being put up and it costing this proportion
in fees and forced-sale losses to sell the house and recover its value in cash.
We modify the workings of the model according to these two assumptions 
these modications are shown in an appendix.3
It is at this point we introduce the idea of cash as collateral. If a rm
holds some cash on its balance sheet, this can be recovered directly with no
loss of value and no verication cost; thus it eliminates the cost . We show
in the appendix that the elimination of this cost lowers the credit premium
for given leverage; it therefore permits rms to increase leverage and so raise
their expected returns. We therefore assume that banks and rms have an
interest in rms holding as much cash as can be acquired for collateral. Thus
as M0 is issued we assume that it is acquired by rms from banks to be held
as collateral. This e¤ect of the monetary base on collateral echoes Williamson
(2013) in a search model.
The government/central bank issues this cash through open market oper-
ations (QE) to households in exchange for government bonds they hold. They
deposit this cash with the banks. Firms wish to acquire as much of this cash
as possible for their collateral needs. We can think of them as investing their
net worth in cash (to the maximum available), with the rest going into other
collateral and capital. In practice of course their prots (which create their
3The posting of collateral actually lowers rms prots from borrowing for given net
worth and leverage; this is because collateral has no yield and could be sold for higher
protable investment. Hence it seems to be puzzling that banks demand collateral in a
contract designed to maximise rms prots subject to the constraints of truth-telling and
bank zero net prots due to competition. However, undoubtedly collateral is a routine
precaution taken by banks engaged in arms length lending. The natural interpretation of
collateral in this context is that it ensures that the borrower does not abscond; in the event
of absconding the collateral is directly seizable. Equivalent amounts are taken in numerous
nancial transactions as deposits, margin and so on.
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net worth) are continuously paid out as dividends to the banks which provide
them with credit, so they have nothing with which to acquire these assets if
they do not collaborate with banks. So they achieve this balance sheet out-
come by agreeing with the banks that, as a minimum counterpart to the credit
advanced they will hold the maximum cash collateral available, which is M0.
Thus all of M0 at once nds its way into rms balance sheets, where it is se-
curely pledged to the banks in the event of bankruptcy (for example by being
actually lodged with them); in practice as we explain below in the balance
sheets it would be held as a counterpart deposit by rms and the M0 held by
the banks.
Finally, the short-term interest rate is set by the central bank according
to some rule, such as the Taylor Rule. In our model here only rms hold M0;
households have no use for it and deposit it at once in banks where as we have
seen it is lent to rms to hold as collateral, in e¤ect M0s only use. In New
Keynesian models it is implicitly assumed that the Taylor Rule is enforced by
open market operations of some sort, presumably in money and Treasury Bills.
Here we make the assumption that it is enforced by open market operations
in public debt; households hold part of their savings in government bonds, the
rest in bank deposits, which pay the short term interest rate also obtainable on
Treasury Bills (treated here as an equivalent asset). The Taylor Rule represents
the short term interest rate at which the government debt o¢ce will borrow;
hence it sets the Treasury Bill rate and so the bank deposit rate.4
This now gives our monetary authorities three instruments: ; M0 and
r: Accordingly, apart from their interest rate setting rule they will need two
other operating rules for these instruments. We will discuss these shortly.
First, we set out the balance sheets of the agents in the economy and
discuss how they are altered by acts of policy (see Table 1).
where COLL= collateral (exM0=held as non-monetary; M0=held as money);
4Thus in e¤ect this rate determines household consumption (directly as the safe rate on
deposits) and (indirectly via the bank credit rate, together with other e¤ects on this) rms
investment. Private plus public spending in turn sets total demand which is satised by
suppliers; ination then responds to the output gap, as suppliers reset prices, so clearing
the goods market.
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Firms Banks Households Govt/central bank
A L A L A L A L
  COLL  exM0 
COLL  CDEP (M0)+
K+
  NW
CR+
  CR+
MO+
   DEP+
CDEP (M0)+
  DEP+
GB 
  CUMSAV   CUMDEF  GB 
M0+

Table 1: Balance Sheets of the Agents of the Economy
K=capital investment; NW=net worth; CR=credit; DEP=deposits; GB =
government bonds; CUMSAV=stock of private savings; CUMDEF=accumulated
government borrowing; M0=monetary base. For simplicity we have written as
if the rms hold M0 directly; in practice of course they would hold it indirectly
as a marked deposit with the bank, and the bank would hold the M0 on its
behalf  ready to seize it as collateral in the event of bankruptcy. This is
shown in the above balance sheets as CDEP(M0) which is an asset of rms
corresponding to their M0 deposit; in turn it is a liability of banks, which
hold the corresponding M0 as an asset. Thus injections of M0 by the central
bank wind up being held as liquid collateral by banks to back up their credit
operations.
Consider now how an open market operation (QE) by buying GB for M0
would change these balance sheets  as indicated by + and   in this table.
Households place the extra cash on deposit; the banks then lend it to rms
who are able to use it as collateral in a future lending deal with the banks, so
that a larger part of collateral is held as M0. With collateral cheaper ( falls)
the bank credit premium falls (which will induce a future rise in investment
and leverage); the other collateral is converted into capital stock. These are
the partial equilibrium or direct e¤ects, which then lead to further general
equilibrium changes in response to the fall in the credit premium.
To adjust the model for these additional features, we need to introduce
the e¤ect of M0 on the credit premium via its e¤ect on the cost of liquidating
collateral, ; and we need to add , the macro-prudential instrument directly
raising the credit friction, into the credit premium equation. We can think
of  as being like a bu¤er of M0 that the banks need to hold for reasons
of liquidity, and that is hence unavailable for use as collateral; hence it is
equivalent to negative M0. The credit premium equation now has additional
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terms in m (=lnM0) and , as follows:
Etcyt+1   (rt   Ett+1) = st =  (qqt + kt   nt)   mt + t + eprt (6)
where  is the elasticity of the premium to M0 via its collateral role. This
e¤ect comes about, conditional on leverage (k   n), through the willingness
of banks (under their zero prot condition) to reduce the credit premium for
given leverage. Now that they will recover more in the event of bankruptcy, the
equilibrium contract, for given leverage, now has a lower bankruptcy threshold
and a lower required rate of return on rm assets. Both produce a lower credit
premium for given leverage.
We now need equations for the supply of M0 and for the setting of .
QE programmes have sought to raise money supply growth (and implicitly
therefore credit growth); before these programmes M0 seems to have been set
to accommodate the supply of credit/broad money generated at the interest
rates set by the Taylor Rule.
Macro-prudential measures have been built on the Basel Agreements nos 1
and 2; clearly they have been made more harsh over this period in response to
the crisis, which was unpredicted by o¢cials. Before that there was a gradual
tightening of regulation at least in the Agreements, if not always in practical
application by individual countries.
What these considerations suggest, as argued above, is that the supply of
M0 was supplied via the discount window, before the crisis when interest rates
were above the zero bound, as required to support the supply of money (M in
logs); after the crisis, when interest rates were at the zero bound (which we
take to be 0:25% p.a.), M0 (i.e. QE) seems to have been targeting the credit
premium around its steady state, s, aiming to bring credit conditions back
to normal. For macro-prudential measures the above suggests that they have
evolved as an exogenous I(1) time-series process, with the crisis acting as an
exogenous shock to the process.
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So we write the equation for M0 in two parts:
mt =  0 +  1Mt + errm2t for rt > 0:0625%
and mt =  2(st   s
) + errm2t for rt  0:0625%
where  1;  2 are both positive. The credit premium tends to be corre-
lated inversely with the broad money supply, so that one may think of this
approximately as a policy of money targeting; however the money element
in the banks balance sheet uctuates with other things and so from a wel-
fare viewpoint it is the credit premium that should be targeted with as much
information on it as can be amassed, including that from M itself.
We write the equation for the macro-prudential instrument as:
t = errxit
Given that we have very poor data on these macro-prudential measures we
have to this point simply included these in the error eprt.
Finally, we need an equation now additionally for the supply of money,
which we dene as equal to deposits (= credit) +M0. Here we simply use the
rms balance sheet (M = CR +M0 = K + COLL NW +M0) which can
be written in loglinearised form as:
Mt = (1 +    c  )Kt + mt   nt
where M , K, m, n are respectively the logs of Money, capital, M0 and net
worth, we have omitted the constant (which includes collateral, assumed xed
as a proportion of money); ; ; c are respectively the ratios of net worth, M0
and collateral to money.5
We treat the above model with money as a third version. The nal step is
to allow for the zero bound on the government short-term bond rate. To do
5Notice that in this model the demand for money is simply the demand for deposits
as a savings vehicle. Savings in the model are equal to investment by market-clearing, so
that any additional investment requiring additional bank supply of leverage is equal to the
additional supply of savings.
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this we note that when this interest rate solves above 0:25%, the Taylor Rule
sets interest rates so that ination is determined. The operative M0 equation
is the one supporting the broad money supply.
However when interest rate solves for 0.25% or below it can fall no further
than 0.25% and so it is set at this level and the Taylor Rule is rendered inop-
erative; when this happens, the model retains ination determinacy because
at some point in the future the model emerges from the zero bound and the
Taylor Rule is again operative. The operative M0 equation is the one targeting
the credit premium.
The full model is given in Appendix 2.
2 The method of Indirect Inference
We use the method of Indirect Inference in order to evaluate whether the model
can t the data. This method was proposed in Minford et al. (2009) and
rened by Le et al. (2011) who used Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the
method. Indirect Inference uses an auxiliary model to produce a description of
the data. This auxiliary model is independent of the theoretical model and the
performance of the theory is evaluated indirectly against it. The descriptors of
the data can be the auxiliary model parameter estimates (or functions of these)
when applied to the data. The theoretical model is then simulated and the
auxiliary model estimated on each simulation to nd the models description
of the data.
Indirect Inference has traditionally been used in the estimation of structural
models (e.g. Smith, 1993; Gregory and Smith, 1991, 1993; Gourieroux et al.,
1993; Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995; Canova, 2005), but we can also use it
to evaluate a structural model. We do this by comparing the performance
of the auxiliary model estimated on simulated data with the auxiliary model
estimated on the actual data. If our structural model is correct then it should
be able to produce simulations with time series properties that statistically
match those of the actual data.
In practice the auxiliary model is chosen to be a VARMA as for non-
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stationary data, as we use here, the reduced form of a macro model is a
VARMA. This in turn can be approximated as a VECM (see Appendix 3).
We follow Meenagh et al. (2012) and use a VECM as the auxiliary model,
which is then re-expressed as a VAR(1) for our three main macroeconomic
variables of interest (output, ination and interest rate) including a time trend
and the productivity residual as an exogenous non-stationary process. These
two exogenous terms have the e¤ect of achieving cointegration.
We use the VAR coe¢cients and the VAR error variances as our descriptors
of the data and then compute a Wald statistic from these. In e¤ect we are
testing whether the dynamics, volatility and cointegrating relations observed
in the data are explained by the simulated joint distribution of these.
In order to estimate the model we use a Simulated Annealing algorithm to
nd the minimum-value Wald statistic for the model. This gives us a set of
parameters that produces simulations that are closest to the data. These esti-
mates have been shown to be consistent and asymptotically normal (see Smith,
1993; Gregory and Smith, 1991, 1993; Gourieroux et al., 1993; Gourieroux and
Monfort, 1995; Canova, 2005).
We use Indirect Inference rather than the now widely-used Bayesian ap-
proach to estimating our model here, because we wish to test the model as
a whole against the data. Under the Bayesian approach one assumes that
the prior distributions and the model structure are correct; but because of
well-known controversies in macroeconomics, this is not an assumption we can
(yet) make. Even a major model like the Smets-Wouters (2007) model of the
U.S., that was carefully estimated by Bayesian methods, was rejected by our
indirect inference test, see Le et al. (2011). Under uncertainty about the priors
any model ranking or probability assessment we made would be a¤ected by
the choice of priors. Thus our aim is to nd a model that we can say is not
rejected by the data features, so that we can rely on it for discussions of policy;
at a later stage of analysis when such a model has been found to be generally
reliable, one could progress to the use of Bayesian methods in rening it.
For overall testing we could also have used the common Likelihood Ratio
(LR) test instead of the Wald test  a Bayesian test with at priors (which
16
might be used given lack of agreement on priors) amounts in e¤ect to an
LR test. This test is examined carefully in Le et al. (2015) who nd that
the two methods test quite di¤erent properties of the model in their check
on its misspecication: the LR test is based on a models in-sample current
forecasting ability whereas the Wald is based on the ability of the model,
including its implied errors, to replicate the behaviour of the data, as found
in the VAR coe¢cients and the data variances. In e¤ect the Wald test asks
in a parsimonious way whether the model can replicate the impulse response
functions found in the data. This reects our aims for the use of the model,
to assess the impulse response functions of policy shocks.
It turns out that the Wald has far greater power than the LR in the context
of a macro model like the one here; this property is demonstrated for the orig-
inal Smets-Wouters model over the sample period 1947Q1  2004Q4 by Le et
al. (2015) whose comparative table we reproduce next. Table 2 shows a Monte
Carlo experiment with the SW model treated as true, generating stationary
data; this model is mis-specied by changing the parameters alternately by
+=   x% . The rejection rate for the Wald rises sharply with x. The table
also shows the same exercise on non-stationary data: the power of the Wald
remains much the same as with stationary data. The LR test loses power on
non-stationary data, for reasons Le et al. (2015) discuss.
Percent Mis-specied Wald LR Wald LR
Stationary data Non-stationary data
True 5:0 5:0 5:0 5:0
1 19:8 6:3 7:9 5:2
3 52:1 8:8 49:2 5:8
5 87:3 13:1 97:8 6:2
7 99:4 21:6 100:0 7:4
10 100:0 53:4 100:0 9:6
15 100:0 99:3 100:0 15:6
20 100:0 99:7 100:0 26:5
Table 2: Rejection Rates for Wald and Likelihood Ratio for 3 Variable VAR(1)
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3 Testing the model against the data
We now evaluate two versions of this model: one with the BGG banking sector;
and one which further adds the monetary base as collateral and switch between
regimes without and with the zero lower bound. We use unltered US data
for the period 19842011. Each model is reestimated by indirect estimation
before its nal test statistic is determined. It can be seen in Table 3 that both
models fail to be rejected at 95%, with p-values in excess of 0.05. Adding the
extra features slightly improves the p-value; hence bringing the model more
closely into alignment with real-world features does not damage the models
coherence with the data.
In a later section we show key IRFs for the nal model (i.e. in the nal
column) that we have developed here. We must emphasise that because of
the di¤ering monetary responses in the non-crisis (no zero bound) regime
and the crisis regime (zero bound) the responses under the two regimes di¤er
materially. Under the rst, interest rate policy is active and M0 policy is
supportive (i.e. M0 expands as needed to accommodate rising M2, and vice
versa); under the second interest rate policy is enforcedly inactive at the zero
bound and M0 policy is active in controlling the credit premium. Also under
the rst regulative policy was inactive (and largely ine¤ective in the control of
monetary conditions since M0 is supportive of M2; under the second regulative
policy was active though it is only modelled here as an exogenous error process
and not a reactive policy).
We will argue that welfare would be improved if monetary policy combined
an interest rate rule (whenever feasible) with an active M0 rule and if regulative
policy were dropped. So one regime we will examine closely in what follows is
where these things are done  we will call it the Monetary Reform regime.
Improvement would also come if the interest rate rule were targeting the price
level, or even better nominal GDP.
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Model Coe¢cients: 1984Q1-2011Q4
Model with
Banking alone
Model with
Banking and Money
Elasticity
of capital adjustment
' 7:376 6:814
Elasticity of consumption c 1:476 1:700
External habit formation  0:646 0:714
Probability of not changing
wages
w 0:813 0:627
Elasticity of labour supply L 4:915 2:683
Probability of not changing
prices
p 0:882 0:973
Wage indexation w 0:943 0:354
Price indexation p 0:202 0:168
Elasticity of capital utilisation  0:053 0:104
Share of xed costs in
production (+1)
 1:400 1:761
Taylor Rule response
to ination
rp 4:266 2:375
Interest rate smoothing  0:786 0:737
Taylor Rule response
to output
ry 0:036 0:025
Taylor Rule response
to change in output
ry 0:055 0:021
Share of capital in production  0:156 0:178
Proportion of sticky wages !w 0:444 0:442
Proportion of sticky prices !r 0:066 0:090
Elasticity of the premium
with respect to leverage
 0:012 0:032
Money response to premium  2 N=A 0:065
Elasticity of the
premium to M0
 N=A 0:055
Money response to credit growth  1 N=A 0:043
WALD (Y; ;R) 21:263 21:9037
Fixed parameters p-value 0:0656 0:0686
Table 3: Coe¢cient Estimates (1984Q1-2011Q4)
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4 Accounting for the Banking Crisis
It is widely argued that there needs to be regulative intervention in order to
prevent future crises by preventing banks from lending excessively. We look at
this argument in two ways through the prism of the model we have constructed
here. First we consider the actual causes of this particular crisis according to
the model. Second, we do a stochastic analysis in which we create many
pseudo-histories to see how often purely banking shocks (which we assume
could be prevented by regulation) have produced a crisis; and also how much
di¤erence banking shocks and banking transmission (which again we assume
could have been controlled by regulation) have made to the crises we could
have had.
We analyse what the model says should happen in the economy during
and after the Great Recession. We use that charts that follow for main macro
variables: output, ination and interest rate.
In these charts we isolate monetary factors in the great recession and in
particular
a) two factors that were operating through banking transmission: net worth
and the regulative shock to the credit premium,
b) two factors that were due purely to monetary policy: the Taylor Rule
and M0 and nally
c) all other factors (the Rest) which can be considered the normal causes
of the business cycle.
Output (Figure 1) is dominated by net worth (creating bank leverage),
regulatory shocks to banks (deregulation before, followed by sharp tightening),
and general business cycle shocks. Monetary policy proper plays little part,
by contrast with the standard model.
Interest rates (Figure 2) until the zero bound hits are dominated by the
Taylor Rule and the general business cycle, with smaller contributions from
regulative and net worth shocks. The decomposition is telling us that in the
upswing before the crisis the credit boom was little restrained by the rise in
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Figure 1: Shock decomposition for output for the period 2005-2011
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Figure 2: Shock decomposition for interest rate for the period 2005-2011
Ination (Figure 3) is dominated by business cycle shocks. During this
period ination did not uctuate much except in response for raw material
price shocks. The Feds implicit ination target appears to have anchored
domestically generated ination with great solidity.
The overall picture is of an economy enjoying a strong banking boom until
the crisis, at which point the same forces driving the boom went into reverse.
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Figure 3: Shock decomposition for ination for the period 2000-2011
4.1 The causes of crisis
We can ask a further question: what is the nature of a crisis and what causes
it, according to our analysis of this sample? A crisis is dened as a severe
interruption in output growth for at least three years and a nancial crisis as a
crisis in which there is also a binding zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate. First, we analyse potential scenarios by using bootstrap simulations from
the model and its shocks for the period 19842007, a period that excludes the
massive nancial shocks  we call these standard shock scenarios. Then we
look at the bootstrap simulations with the full sample of shocks 19842011 
we call these crisis-inclusive shock scenarios.
We nd the following results:
1) Crisis is a normal part of the US economy: Crises are regular results
from standard shock scenarios. The shocks from the nancial crisis period
are not necessary conditions for big economic recessions. Figures 4 and 5 show
some examples of the bootstrap simulations.
We nd that on average crises appear every 52 years. With crisis-inclusive
shock scenarios, crises become more frequent  every 48 years. However, qual-
itatively their behaviour is similar to the standard shock scenarios illustrated
below. The inclusion of crisis shocks adds to the shock volatility.
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Figure 4: Crises without nancial crisis
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Figure 5: Crises with nancial crisis
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2) When there is a crisis, about half the time there is also a nancial crisis
where the nominal interest rate is driven down to the zero lower bound  the
charts above show some illustrations of each with standard shocks. This ratio
is the same when crisis-inclusive shocks are used.
3) From Figure 5 we can see that an extreme nancial shock is not required
to produce a nancial crisis. This follows from the fact that we generated
nancial crises simply using the standard shock scenarios. Including crisis
shocks simply adds to the frequency of crises as we have seen.
4) Financial shocks on their own are not su¢cient to produce crisis. We
created bootstrap scenarios using only nancial shocks but including the crisis.
These scenarios did not produce any economic crisis.
What we see here is rather in line with the conclusions of Stock and Watson
(2012) from a VAR factor analysis of the period: that the nancial crisis period
did not have a bigger share of nancial shocks generating it than previous US
business cycles. The shocks were just generally bigger. Thus we nd the
Great Recession was a crisis and a nancial crisis: but its triggers were the
usual mixture of real and nancial shocks.
5 Implications of the model for policy
We begin with scal policy which many have argued holds the key to respond-
ing to crisis conditions. We interpret it here as a government spending shock.
Then we look at monetary policy and regulative policy. Finally we consider
possible changes to the monetary regime, which we divide into the initiation of
a separate rule for active M0 setting via open market operations, side by side
with an interest rate rule  we call this Monetary Reform; and modications
of the interest rate rule where we consider Price Level Targeting (PLT) and
Nominal GDP Targeting (NGDPT).
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5.1 Fiscal Policy (Responses to Government Spending
Shock)
Figure 6 shows the scal multiplier e¤ects in the standard non-crisis context
where the Taylor Rule is operating. We see the usual e¤ects: a rise in ination
and interest rates (via the Taylor Rule) which reduce (crowd out) invest-
ment, while consumption rises very slightly on the prospect of higher future
output/income. Real wages rise with higher output and labour hours rise.
Basically the rise in net output is equal to the rise in government spending
(other demand e¤ects are very small) and is made possible with a roughly
constant capital stock by rising labour supply, through higher wages, and by
higher capital consumption (with rising capacity utilisation) which adds to
gross GDP. With rising entrepreneurial net worth, the credit premium falls
and credit rises. The resulting impact scal multiplier is 1.3; beyond the out-
put directly produced to satisfy higher government demand the rise in capital
consumption adds to gross GDP, which raises the multiplier from 1.0 (on net
GDP) to 1.3 (on gross GDP).6 There is no di¤erence between the multiplier
before the crisis and that with the zero bound. Consumption rises very slightly
more under the zero bound but the key impact in raising their consumption at
all is the substitution e¤ect of higher wages and labour supply which occur in
order to permit the extra government spending to be converted into output;
this is the same across both regimes.
5.2 Monetary Policy
5.2.1 Responses to Taylor Rule Shock.
Figure 7 shows the e¤ects of an increase in the nominal interest rate. This
is a quite standard picture, not dissimilar from most New Keynesian models.
6In recent empirical work a large multiplier has been found for tax cuts  eg Romer
and Romer (2012). However, these e¤ects may well be the result of supply-side e¤ects of
tax structure or even e¤ects of inter-temporal income-shifting rather than the Keynesian
multiplier e¤ects we are discussing here. This model is not equipped to deal with those
other e¤ects.
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Figure 6: IRFs for a government spending shock to the non-crisis (solid) and
crisis model (dashed)
The real interest rate rises, discouraging both consumption and investment.
This reduces output, hours and real wages. It also lowers entrepreneurs net
worth, so raising the risk premium which contributes to the further drop in
investment; with lower net worth there is distress borrowing from banks which
leads to an accommodating rise in M0.
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Figure 7: IRFs for a Taylor Rule shock to the non-crisis model
26
5.2.2 Responses to Quantitative Easing Shock
Figure 8 shows the e¤ects of a rise in M0 under normal and crisis regimes.
Under the normal regime the e¤ect is to lower the credit premium and set o¤
an investment boom. This stimulates more output, higher real wages/labour
supply and more consumption. This in turn generates ination and a response
from the Taylor Rule raising real interest rates and so limiting the rise in
consumption. M0 accommodates the rise in credit.
Under the crisis regime, there is also a fall in the risk premium and in-
vestment rises. But the Taylor Rule response is cut out and this eliminates
one o¤setting mechanism to the stimulus. Instead, M0 gradually reverses the
stimulus in response to the falling risk premium.
Hence a stimulus to M0 has positive e¤ects on output with or without the
Taylor Rule, revealing that there is more to monetary policy than the setting
of the Fed funds rate: direct open market operations are e¤ective in this model
in their own right.
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Figure 8: IRFs for a M0 shock to the non-crisis (solid) and crisis model
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5.3 Regulative Policy
5.3.1 Responses to credit premium shock (Macro-prudential pol-
icy)
More regulations, such as Basel 2 and 3, raise the credit premium. The e¤ects
of imposing more regulations on banking businesses are approximated here
by a credit premium shock. Figure 9 shows that a higher credit premium
under either crisis or non-crisis regimes results in lower output, consumption,
investment, net worth, capital, working hours and real wages. When the
Taylor Rule is operating it o¤sets the impact of regulative tightening; when
the economy is at the zero bound, M0 expansion o¤sets it somewhat more
aggressively under the baseline model.
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Figure 9: IRFs for a premium shock to the non-crisis (solid) and crisis model
(dashed)
It is clear from these impulse responses that macro-prudential policy is
feasible in principle. However we do not pursue it here as a potential reform
because for it to operate as a stabilisation tool regulative policy needs to
be set at a distortionary level, so that its tightness can be both raised and
lowered. The model does not readily supply a method for calculating its cost
other than through the temporary e¤ects (on investment and output) shown in
these responses. The distortionary cost comes through its long-term e¤ects on
28
productivity through inhibiting intermediation. However, we will see in what
follows that there are alternative monetary regimes that can reduce instability;
if so there is no case for using this distortionary regime for this purpose.
5.4 Changes in the monetary regime
The Great Recession showed that an economy with ination targeting alone
struggled to cope with big shocks to the economy and might even contribute
to nancial instability (Beckworth, 2014) and welfare losses because monetary
policy was too tight (and may have been too loose in the boom that led up to
it). As a result of cutting nominal interest rates dramatically in response to big
economic shocks, many OECD countries are in the zero lower bound situation.
New Keynesian economists have argued that this is a liquidity trap situation,
but the model shows that there is a strong impact of quantitative easing under
the zero bound. In this section, we discuss some possible changes to regulative
and monetary regimes that could improve economic stability, compared with
the baseline regime (embedded in the model) of ination targeting, minimal
regulation and a fairly weak M0 response to the credit premium.
Our main focus with these alternative regimes is their capacity to reduce
the number of crises. We also look at the more conventional measure of busi-
ness cycle welfare cost, as measured by the weighted sum of the variances (over
the business cycle) of consumption and hours of work; we also look at a widely
used alternative measure, the weighted sum of the cycle variances of output
and ination. These measures abstract from any changes in deterministic or
stochastic trends, on the grounds that monetary policy cannot a¤ect these
trends. Here we follow the usual practice of proxying these trends with an HP
lter (applied to each variable in each simulation).
5.4.1 Monetary reform
One of the features of the run-up to the Great Recession was a substantial
expansion of money and credit, permitted by the ination targeting regime.
This came about because ination did not respond much to this expansion,
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anchored as it was by expectations that the ination target would be e¤ective.
Yet since monetary expansion has a stimulative e¤ect on the economy, sup-
plementing the interest rate rule with a money supply rule could be helpful
to stability. We now investigate how a monetary reform regime of this type
might work; we assume it is implemented in both non-crisis and crisis times.
Here we supplement the Taylor Rule with a powerful M0 rule responding to
the credit premium with a response much larger than in the baseline model.
Figure 10 shows IRFs of models variables to a credit premium shock with
(dashed line) and without (thick line) the counteractive M0 rule. It can be
seen that it stabilises investment and the credit premium.
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Figure 10: IRFs from the credit premium shock under noncrisis model with
monetary reform (dashed) and non crisis model without monetary reform
(solid)
The optimal monetary reform takes the following form
mt = 0:106 (st   s
)
To measure its e¤ect in stabilising the economy we perform a large number
of bootstrap simulations over the sample period and compute the average
frequency of crisis as dened above, namely a drop of at least 3% in output
where output does not recover to its previous peak for 3 years. This M0 rule
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brings down the frequency from every 48 years in the baseline case to every
151 years  tripling stability. On the more conventional measures of welfare
it reduces them both substantially (see Table 4).
5.4.2 Price-level targeting regime
The zero lower bound situation and the recession associated with it has re-
newed interest in price level targeting (PLT) as a better alternative monetary
policy that can achieve price stability while also reducing the impact of the
zero lower bound (Wolman, 2005; Vestin, 2006; Nakov, 2008; and Dib et al,
2008; for a recent survey see Hatcher and Minford, 2014). Under PLT, ina-
tion expectations adjust to stabilise the economy: if an unanticipated shock
pushes the price level below the target, people will expect higher than average
ination in the future to bring the price level back to the target. PLT has two
advantages over ination targeting. First, due to the automatic adjustment in
ination expectations, the central bank does not need to move interest rates
aggressively in response to shocks (Cover and Pecorino, 2005), thus it reduces
the likelihood of hitting the zero bound. Second, PLT can generate positive
ination expectations in a deationary situation, lowering real interest rates
even at the zero bound and so strengthening recovery.
The PLT rule is specied as follows:
rt = 1rt 1+(1  1)

 (pt   p) + y(yt   y
) + y [(yt   y
)  (yt 1   y
)]
	
+ert
Under the zero ination steady state, the steady price level is assumed constant
here and normalised as p = 0:
We are looking for an optimal PLT specication that provides the least
frequency of crisis under our bootstrap simulations. The following PLT
rt = 0:545rt 1+(1  0:545) f1:745pt + 0:021(yt   y
) + 0:026 (yt   yt 1)g+ert
reduces crisis frequency to 464 years from the baseline 48. On the conventional
measures it also improves matters on a similar scale to monetary reform. Again
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it raises the variance of ination, as intended (Table 4).
5.4.3 Nominal GDP targeting
A group known as Market Monetarists who run a widely-accessed blog on
monetary policy, have been calling for monetary policy to target the level of
nominal GDP (NGDP), rather than either a monetary aggregate or ination
(Sumner 2011, Nunes and Cole 2013). A similar proposal was made some time
ago in a series of papers by McCallum (1988) and McCallum and Nelson (1999)
who suggested a rule setting interest rates in response to deviations of nominal
GDP growth from a target rate. McCallum argued that this rule would be
superior to monetary targeting because of the large and unpredictable changes
in payments technology and nancial regulations. Compared with the later
Taylor Rule McCallums rule has interest rates responding as strongly to out-
put growth deviations as to ination deviations. However, Market Monetarists
argue for targeting the level of NGDP rather than its growth rate; the rea-
sons are similar to those for PLT, except that in this case an expected future
interest rate stimulus is triggered also by output falling below its trend (Mc-
Callum, 2011). A concern about this is that with a stochastic productivity
trend monetary policy would be a¤ected by permanent shifts in productivity;
thus the NGDP rule we use here allows for changes in the models produc-
tivity trend  since this is hard for the central bank to estimate, the results
for the NGDP rule shown here are best case. Nevertheless, if this best case
can be assumed, the NGDP rule generates expectations of very strong mone-
tary responses in conditions of prolonged recession  analogous to Roosevelts
1930s abandonment of the Gold Standard (Krugman, 2011; Carney, 2012 and
Woodford, 2012).
Implementing the NGDP target, the central bank would specify an inter-
mediate target for the o¢cial interest rate. The rule might be written as
follows:
rt = 1rt 1 + y(yt + pt   yt   p) + ert
where y+ p is the target for NGDP, where p = 0 and yt follows the trend path
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in real output generated by productivity.
Given this general rule, we bootstrap our model and implied shocks to see
whether implementing the NGDP targeting regime could help to stabilise the
economy. We found that the rule in of form of
rt = 0:859rt 1 + 1:827(pt + yt   yt) + ert
reduces further the frequency of crisis to 541 years, from PLTs 464. Measured
by the conventional welfare measures NGDPT does better than PLT if one uses
the one with output variance and worse if one uses the one with consumption
variance (Table 4).
5.4.4 Combining PLT or NGDPT with monetary reform
We also consider the alternative monetary regimes where the central bank com-
bines price level targeting or nominal GDP targeting with the M0 rule. Table
4 brings all these results together. It shows that crises are reduced further un-
der either combination; of the two the PLT+Monetary-Reform combination
outperforms the NGDPT combination on the standard welfare cost measure
if one uses the measure with consumption variance and under performs it on
the measure with output variance.
Base
case
Monetary
Reform
PLT NGDPT
PLT+
Mon.
Reform
NGDPT+
Mon.
Reform
Frequency of crisisy 20:8 6:62 2:15 1:83 1:41 1:31
Exp welfare cost (1) 1:43 0:65 0:662 0:657 0:646 0:663
var(cons) 0:498 0:151 0:121 0:121 0:117 0:124
var(hours) 0:932 0:499 0:541 0:536 0:529 0:539
Exp welfare cost (2) 2:652 0:563 0:576 0:558 0:564 0:526
var(output) 2:619 0:544 0:522 0:54 0:512 0:474
var(ination) 0:033 0:019 0:054 0:018 0:054 0:052
Frequency of zero bound
(per 1000 years)
34:8 20:2 21:2 14:1 20:7 13:9
yexpected crises per 1000 years
equal weights for each variance
Table 4: Frequency of crisis and stability under di¤erent monetary regimes
There is no unambiguous winner from these suggested regimes. Both the
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PLT and NGDPT combinations o¤er a big rise in stability with a slight rise in
ination variance (the standard deviation of the annualised ination rate rises
by 0.2%). If one wishes to minimise ination variance the best way to increase
stability is the straight NGDPT regime on its own; but with NGDPT on its
own or in combination the central bank needs to assess the productivity trend
correctly, which may cause di¢culties. In the last row we show the frequency
of zero-bound episodes; this is not so much a measure of stability for the
economy, as for the policy regime. The regime that minimises zero bound
episodes is again NGDPT, with or without monetary reform; the frequency
then comes down to one episode every 70 years.
We have shown in Figure 11 charts of several crisis episodes, to illustrate
how these di¤erent regimes work to increase stability. As one can see, in all
cases the new regimes inject stabilising action when the economy surges or
collapses. Also it is quite apparent (as it is from Table 4 of stability measures)
that all the regimes operate in a broadly similar way, with similar quantitative
e¤ects. The reason they are so similar is that all of them are integral control
mechanisms; that is to say, they all react to a measure of the level of the
economys state relative to its target level and their reaction in all cases is to
move yields (either the government interest rate or the private credit rate or
both) until the state gets close to target.
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Figure 11: Two examples of simulated output under di¤erent rules
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5.5 How reliable are these policy results?
We may use the high power of the Indirect Inference test, mentioned earlier,
to assess the robustness of our proposed policy rules to potential model error.
The error we are concerned about is in the values of the parameters since we
have shown elsewhere that the power against mis-specication is close to or
at 100% (for example Le et al, 2015, assessed the rejection rate of the New
Classical model when the model is New Keynesian at 99.6%).
To assess the chances of the test rejecting general parameter error we do a
Monte Carlo experiment. We generate 10,000 samples from this as the True
model and then perturb all the parameters alternately by + or  x% where
we call x the degree of falseness. We then carry out our test on each False
model and check how many of the 10,000 samples would reject it. The results
are shown in Table 5 where it can be seen that once the model is 9% or more
False rejection reaches 100%. This implies we can be sure, since the model
we have has not been rejected, that it must be within a bound of True to 9%
False.
Falseness (%) True 1 3 5 9 10 15 20
Rejection Rate 5:0 4:6 14:9 58:1 99:8 100 100 100
Table 5: Rejection Rates for II test for 3 Variables (Output, Ination and
Interest Rates) - Non-Stationary data
This allows us to frame a robustness check on our policy results as discov-
ered from this model. The model could be True in which case our results are
as calculated; or it could be up to 9% False, in which case we can recompute
our results on a model version that alters the parameters back to True by the
9% Falseness adjustment, which gives us a worst case scenario. The actual
results on whatever is the true model must lie somewhere between these two
endpoints. This operation is done for the number of crises in Table 6. What
we see is that on the worst case scenario our policy rules reduce the number of
crises to approximately one per 70 years, a frequency that most would see as
an acceptable outcome in return for eliminating the huge post-crisis regulative
machine.
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Crises per 1000 years
Base Mon. PLT NGDPT PLT+ NGDPT+
case Reform M. Reform M. Reform
MODEL
True 20:8 6:62 2:15 1:83 1:41 1:31
IIW: 9% False 44:0 28:7 13:3 14:9 12:6 15:7
Notes:
Base Case: monetary policies as estimated over the sample period;
Monetary Reform: Monetary Base rule (responds to credit premium) + Taylor Rule;
PLT:substituting Price Level Target for Ination Target in Taylor Rule;
NGDPT: substituting Nominal GDP target for ination and output targets in Taylor Rule.
Table 6: Policy analysis when model have varying falseness
Our robustness analysis here covers general falseness. One could consider
more specialised robustness analysis: for example one could look at the models
vulnerability to error on key sub-groups of parameters. Such a choice of analy-
sis can be dened by policy users. However, the methods power against any
such vulnerability can be clearly assessed by Monte Carlo experiment and the
necessary robustness range then applied. Our point is that policymakers under
these methods have strong tools to assess policy vulnerability.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we attempt to remedy the lack of a role for money in prevailing
empirically-based DSGE models. The route we choose is to give money a role
in providing cheap collateral in a model of banking; this means that monetary
policy can a¤ect the risk-premium on bank lending to rms by varying the
supply of M0 in open market operations. This e¤ect comes on top of the usual
rate-setting of the safe interest rate done via the Taylor Rule in normal times.
But it implies that even when the zero bound prevails monetary policy is still
e¤ective; it also implies that scal policy, which has a modest multiplier e¤ect
in normal times, does not enjoy a free lunch in crisis times due to the zero
bound, as it still crowds out investment via the risk-premium which remains
unbounded from below.
We have estimated and tested this model using Indirect Inference, whose
high power has allowed us to test the policy conclusions robustly. Though this
model is based on standard DSGE foundations, its message is similar to that of
models promulgated by monetarists such as Friedman, Brunner and Meltzer:
that the quantity of money matters and cannot be ignored in favour solely of
an interest-rate-setting rule. For the ECB it justies the existence of a second
pillar. For central banks generally, it suggests that money supply growth
needs to be controlled, over and above the setting of the safe interest rate for
ination targeting reasons, in order to maintain control of credit and avoid
credit booms and busts. We suggest a simple rule for making M0 respond
to credit conditions that can substantially enhance the economys stability.
Both price-level and nominal GDP targeting rules for interest rates would
combine with this to stabilise the economy further; of the two PLT o¤ers the
safest route as it is not dependent on assessing the productivity trend and it
also achieves a similar scale of gain. If these rules for monetary control were
instituted, they would make aggressive regulation of banks balance sheets,
such as has recently been promoted, redundant; since such regulation involves
raising the credit premium in a distortionary way, avoiding it in favour of
monetary control would be welfare-enhancing.
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7 Appendix 1: Augmenting the BGG model
for collateral and money
The assumptions added to BGG are that the banks demand collateral as a
proportion of net worth of c; and that liquidating this collateral costs  per
unit of collateral. The BGG model consists of three parts:
a) a bankruptcy threshold at which rms will choose to default
b) banks zero prot condition (free entry drives prots to zero)  this
condition gives us the banks leverage o¤er curve.
c) rms maximisation of utility subject to a) and b); this gives us the
overall contract.
Now we look at each part in detail:
a) the bankruptcy threshold (!; ! is the return obtained per unit of assets,
distributed as a random variable with a mean of unity): this is such that
the rm is indi¤erent between defaulting and staying in business. If it goes
bankrupt, it loses (1 + RK)!A + cN and it gains ZB. Here Z=1+credit rate
and B= bank borrowing; A is total investment, RK = the rms return on
investment, and N= net worth of the rm. Thus at the threshold ZB =
(1+RK)!A+ cN . Note also that the rms balance sheet is B = A N + cN ;
thus when this condition holds:(1 + RK)!A + cN = Z(A   N + cN). Let
L = A=N= Leverage. Divide the condition by N and obtain: Z = (1+R
K)!L+c
L 1+c
b) banks zero prot condition is given by
[1  F (!)]ZB + (1  )G(!)(1 +RK)A+ cNF (!)(1  ) = (1 +R)B
On the left hand side the rst term is the probability of obtaining the loan
proceeds (ZB), where F (!) is the probability of going bankrupt. In the second
term G(!) is the expected value of the returns per unit asset to be made if the
rm goes bankrupt times the probability of bankruptcy; this is reduced by the
cost of collection, . Finally, there is the recovery of collateral in the event of
bankruptcy minus its liquidation cost : On the right hand side is the cost of
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the funds the bank has received from depositors at the riskless rate, R:
Substitute from the bankruptcy threshold ZB = (1 + RK)!A + cN in
the rst term of the LHS and on the RHS for B from rms balance sheet
B = A N + cN:This gives:
[1  F (!)](1 + RK)!A+ (1  )G(!)(1 + RK)A+ cN(1  F (!)) = (1 +
R)(A N + cN)
Let  (!) = [1  F (!)]! +G(!). Divide by N to obtain:
[ (!) G(!)](1+RK)L = (1+R)(L  1)+ c(1+R  1+ F (!)) so that
we obtain:
L = 1+R c[R+F (!)]
1+R 	(!)(1+RK)
where 	(!) =  (!)  G(!)
This is the banks leverage o¤er curve. It can be readily veried that it
slopes upward and is convex in [1    (!)] space  as shown in the diagram
below.
Note that dL=d! > 0; dL=dRK > 0; dl=d < 0
c) To obtain the overall contract rms utility (returns), relative to their
cost of funds, are maximised. These are given by:
1R
!
f(1+RK)!A+cN ZBgdF (!)
N(1+R)
; now also note that from the bankruptcy thresh-
old ZB = (1 + RK)!A + cN . So it can be seen that the rms returns are
una¤ected by the existence of collateral, essentially because it remains as part
of their gross return if they do not go bankrupt but also, for given total assets
A, the borrowing costs at which they will choose to go bankrupt rise by the
amount of this collateral.
Substituting into the returns from the bankruptcy threshold gives the over-
all returns as:
1R
!
f(1+RK)(! !)AgdF (!)
N(1+R)
= (1+R
K)
(1+R)
L[1  (!)] where the rst two terms give the
total expected return to the rm from its invested capital (A) as a proportion
of its funds, N(1+R) and the last term [1  (!)] is the share of this that goes
to the rm (the bank takes the loan costs if the rm survives and the returns
below ! if it does not).
This utility function gives indi¤erence curves in (!;L) space, that are con-
cave. An interior optimum is reached.
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Figure 12: The optimum contract for (!; L) for given Rk, R, 
We can compute this optimum by maximising (1+R
K)
(1+R)
L[1  (!)] wrt (!;L)
subject to the leverage o¤er curve from the banks L = 1+R c[R+F (!)]
1+R 	(!)(1+RK)
(from
b above). Solving for the implicit function this gives in ! gives us nally the
rms optimum choice of ! as the solution of:
f1 +R  c[R+ F (!)]gf1 +R 
0
(1 +RK)g = f cF
0
(!)[1  (!)]
 
0
(!)
gf1 +R 
	(!)(1 +RK)g
where 
0
= 	
0
(!)
 
0
(!)
+ (1  	
0
(!)
 
0
(!)
)	(!)  1
In addition we have the leverage o¤er curve dening L in terms of ! and
so giving us the total (!;L) solution.
We can now create two equations in (!;L) from the rms optimum and
the banks leverage o¤er. We can rewrite the rms optimum choice using the
banks leverage o¤er as:
1) Lf1 +R  
0
(1 +RK)g = f cF
0
(!)[1  (!)]
 
0
(!)
g
and then we can add the banks leverage o¤er:
2) L = 1+R c[R+F (!)]
1+R 	(!)(1+RK)
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We now investigate the comparative static properties of changes around
the equilibrium by taking the total di¤erential of this two-equation system in
dL; d!; d and dRK : We will evaluate the derivatives at an equilibrium where
 = 0; we do this for convenience because we will be dealing with a heavily
monetised collateral set-up where it is close to zero. Note that in the rest of
the DSGE model lnLt=kt   nt is determined while  is determined by the
provision of M0 as an alternative to illiquid collateral. Thus we can regard
these as exogenous to this banking model subsector which then solves for !
and RK (the return on capital required to make the needed leverage possible).
These two elements are internal to the bank contract decision and unobservable
in the public domain but in turn from these we can solve for the observable
cost of the bank credit, Z; from the bankruptcy threshold as Z = ((1+R
K)!L+c
L 1+c
:
We write the total di¤erential as:
1) f1+R 
0
(1+RK)gdL+L( 
0
)dRK = (derivative = 0)d!+f cF
0
(!)[1  (!)]
 
0
(!)
gd
and
2) dL = Lf 	
0
(!)(1+RK)
1+R 	(!)(1+RK)
gd!+Lf 	(!)
1+R 	(!)(1+RK)
gdRK+f  cF (!)]
1+R 	(!)(1+RK)
gd
Our interest lies in the e¤ect of  on the equilibrium value s of RK and !,
and thus on Z: We begin by noting from 1) that
dRK
d
= f
cF
0
(!)[1   (!)]
L0 0(!)
g = f
cF
0
(!)[1   (!)]
L0 [1  F (!)]
g > 0
and from 2) that:
d!
d
=
d!
dRK
:
dRK
d
+
d!
d
= f
 	(!)
	0(!)(1 +RK)
gf
cF
0
(!)[1   (!)]
L0 0(!)
g+
cF (!)
L	0(!)(1 +RK)
=
cF (!)
L	0(!)(1 +RK)
f1 
F
0
(!)
F (!)
	(!)[1   (!)]
0 0(!)
g
=
cF (!)
L	0(!)(1 +RK)
f1 
F
0
(!)
F (!)
	(!)[1   (!)]
0 [1  F (!)]
g
since we note that  
0
(!) = [1  F (!)]:
The sign of the last total derivative is strictly ambiguous and needs to
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be computed numerically. Consider a bankruptcy rate around 2.3% and a
standard normal distribution of ln! (i.e. with a standard deviation of unity,
so that the bankruptcy threshold will be exactly two standard deviations below
the mean). ! will then take the value of 0.135 (=e 2); F (!) = 0:023; F
0
(!)
F (!)
=
2:3;	(!) '  (!) = [1   F (!)]! = 0:13x0:977 = 0:127 since G(!) ' 0; it
also follows as noted above that 
0
= 	
0
(!)
 
0
(!)
thus f1   F
0
(!)
F (!)
	(!)[1  (!)]

0
[1 F (!)]
g = 0.73
and so is clearly positive for any values around that size of bankruptcy rate
and standard deviation. The reason essentially is that the banks share of
returns, (!); is under the assumed competitive nature of banks quite modest;
and so a rise in the rate of return has only a modest e¤ect on prots while a
rise in the bankruptcy threshold has a much larger e¤ect. Hence at zero prots
with given leverage the trade-o¤ of threshold given up for extra required rate
of return is small.
Finally, we nd
dZ
d
=
L
L  1 + c
f[1 +RK ]
d!
d
+ !
dRK
d
g
=
c
L  1 + c

F (!)
	0(!)
f1 
F
0
(!)
F (!)
	(!)[1   (!)]
0 [1  F (!)]
g+ f
!F
0
(!)[1   (!)]
0 [1  F (!)]
g

> 0
on the assumption that d!
d
> 0 as above.
Thus nally since  is reduced by M0 injections we can conclude that a rise
in M0 will reduce the required return on capital and also the credit premium.
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8 Appendix 2: Model Listing
Consumption Euler equation
ct =


1 + 

ct 1+
1
1 + 

Etct+1+
(c   1)
WL
C
1 + 


c
(lt   Etlt+1) 
0
@ 1  
1 + 


c
1
A (rt   Ett+1)+ebt
(7)
Investment Euler equation
innt =
1
1 + (1 c)
innt 1+
(1 c)
1 + (1 c)
Etinnt+1+
1
(1 + (1 c)) 2'
qqt+einnt
(8)
Tobin Q equation
qqt =
1  
1   +RK
Etqqt+1 +
RK
1   +RK
Etrkt+1   Etcyt+1 (9)
Capital Accumulation equation
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
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
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
1 
1  


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
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1  

 
1 + 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Price Setting equation
rkt = !
r
2
6666664
1
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Wage Setting equation
wt = !
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1
1+(1 c)

(1 (1 c)w)(1 w)
(1+w(w 1))w


wt   llt  

1
1 


ct  


ct 1

+ ewt
3
77775+
(1  !w)

llt +

1
1 


ct  


ct 1

  (t   Et 1t) + ew
S
t

(12)
Labour demand
lt =  wt +

1 +
1   
 

rkt + kt 1 (13)
Market Clearing condition in goods market
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
innt +R
K
 ky
1   
 
rkt + c
e
yc
e
t + egt (14)
Aggregate Production equation
yt = 


1   
 
rkt + kt 1 + (1  ) lt + eat

(15)
Taylor Rule
rt = rt 1 + (1  ) (rpt + ryyt) + ry (yt   yt 1) + ert for rt > 0:0625 (16)
Premium
Etcyt+1   (rt   Ett+1) = st =  (qqt + kt   nt)   mt + t + eprt (17)
Net worth
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nt =
K
N
(cyt   Et 1cyt) + Et 1cyt + nt 1 + enwt (18)
Entrepreneurial consumption
cet = nt (19)
M0
mt =  1Mt+errm2t for rt > 0:0625 and mt =  2(st c
)+errm2t for rt  0:0625
M2
Mt = (1 +    )kt + mt   nt (20)
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9 Appendix 3: VECM
Following Meenagh et al. (2012), we can say that after log-linearisation a
DSGE model can usually be written in the form
A(L)yt = BEtyt+1 + C(L)xt +D(L)et (A1)
where yt are p endogenous variables and xt are q exogenous variables which
we assume are driven by
xt = a(L)xt 1 + d+ c(L)t: (A2)
The exogenous variables may contain both observable and unobservable vari-
ables such as a technology shock. The disturbances et and t are both iid
variables with zero means. It follows that both yt and xt are non-stationary.
L denotes the lag operator zt s = L
szt and A(L), B(L) etc. are polynomial
functions with roots outside the unit circle.
The general solution of yt is
yt = G(L)yt 1 +H(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)t: (A3)
where the polynomial functions have roots outside the unit circle. As yt and
xt are non-stationary, the solution has the p cointegration relations
yt = [I  G(1)]
 1[H(1)xt + f ]
= xt + g: (A4)
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The long-run solution to the model is
yt = xt + g
xt = [1  a(1)]
 1[dt+ c(1)t]
t = 
t 1
i=0t s
Hence the long-run solution to xt, namely, xt = x
D
t + x
S
t has a deterministic
trend xDt = [1  a(1)]
 1dt and a stochastic trend xSt = [1  a(1)]
 1c(1)t.
The solution for yt can therefore be re-written as the VECM
yt =  [I  G(1)](yt 1   xt 1) + P (L)yt 1 +Q(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)t
=  [I  G(1)](yt 1   xt 1) + P (L)yt 1 +Q(L)xt + f + !t (A5)
!t = M(L)et +N(L)t
Hence, in general, the disturbance !t is a mixed moving average process. This
suggests that the VECM can be approximated by the VARX
yt = K(yt 1   xt 1) +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt + g + t (A6)
where t is an iid zero-mean process.
As
xt = xt 1 + [1  a(1)]
 1[d+ t]
the VECM can also be written as
yt = K[(yt 1 yt 1) (xt 1 xt 1)]+R(L)yt 1+S(L)xt+h+t: (A7)
Either equations (A6) or (A7) can act as the auxiliary model. Here we focus
on (A7); this distinguishes between the e¤ect of the trend element in x and
the temporary deviation from its trend. In our models these two elements
have di¤erent e¤ects and so should be distinguished in the data to allow the
greatest test discrimination.
It is possible to estimate (A7) in one stage by OLS. Meenagh et al. (2012)
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do Monte Carlo experiments to check this procedure and nd it to be extremely
accurate.
Our DSGE model here is non-linear since it comprises two regimes between
which the economy shifts according to the shocks hitting it. In this respect
it is similar to the original models estimated by Smith and others under in-
direct inference, which was intended by them to overcome the di¢culty that
the model was non-linear and so could not be estimated by the usual direct
inference methods. As they showed, an auxiliary model that is not the reduced
form of the true model but simply some linear representation of the data be-
haviour yields an indirect inference estimator of the DSGE parameters that is
still asymptotically normal and consistent.
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